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We show that the tasks of privacy amplification against quantum adversaries and data
compression with quantum side information are dual in the sense that the ability to perform
one implies the ability to perform the other. These are two of the most important primitives
in classical information theory, and are shown to be connected by complementarity and
the uncertainty principle in the quantum setting. Applications include a new uncertainty
principle formulated in terms of smooth min- and max-entropies, as well as new conditions
for approximate quantum error correction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two of the most fundamental primitives in information theory are privacy amplification and data
compression with side information, both of which involve manipulating the correlations between
two random variables Z and Y . Privacy amplification is the art of extracting that part of Z which
is uncorrelated from Y . In particular, the goal is to extract uniform randomness, in the form of a
random variable U , from an input Z in such a way that U is completely uncorrelated with Y . In
a cryptographic setting Z might refer to a partially-random and partially-private key string, while
Y refers to knowledge held by an adversary. Meanwhile, the goal of data compression with side
information is essentially the opposite, to determine that part of Z which is not correlated with
Y and to make this available as the compressed version of Z. More specifically, an encoder would
like to compress Z into a smaller random variable C such that a decoder can reconstruct Z given
both C and the side information Y .
These two tasks have direct, purely quantum analogs in quantum information theory. Data
compression with side information translates into distillation of entanglement between two quantum
systems A and B using only classical communication (the analog of C). The quantum version of
privacy amplification is the removal of all correlations (both quantum and classical) between A
and B by actions taken only on A, such that the density matrix for system A is also transformed
into a completely mixed state (the analog of U).
Moreover, in the purely quantum realm the two quantum tasks are dual to one another, a
feature which has been fruitfully exploited to construct a whole family of quantum information
processing protocols [1]. The duality holds for complementary quantum systems, in the sense that
if it is possible to maximally entangle two systems A and B such that A itself is maximally mixed,
then it is possible to completely decouple a maximally-mixed A from the complementary system
R of B, and vice versa [18]. Two systems B and R are complementary, relative to system A, when
the joint quantum state of ABR is a pure state, a state which always exists in principle. That is,
two systems B and R are complementary relative to A when each one is the purifying system for
the other and A [23].
In this paper we show that this duality also extends to the hybrid classical-quantum tasks of
classical privacy amplification against quantum adversaries and classical data compression with
quantum side information: The ability to perform one of the tasks implies the ability to perform
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variable Z and a quantum random variable, i.e. a quantum system B. Despite the hybrid nature
of the resources, the analysis is still within the realm of quantum information theory, as we can
and do imagine that Z is produced by measurement of the quantum system A.
Complementary quantum systems still constitute an important part of the duality, and com-
pression of Z given side information B implies privacy amplification against R and vice versa,
just as in the purely quantum case. However, the duality takes on an additional complementary
character, as the compression task is not dual to privacy amplification of Z against R, but rather it
is dual to privacy amplification of a complementary random variable, which we will call X, against
R. Complementary random variables correspond to outcomes of measuring complementary ob-
servables, observables like position and momentum for which complete certainty in the outcome of
one observable implies complete uncertainty in the outcome of the other. In the present context,
if the random variable Z is the result of measuring an observable ZA on system A, then X is the
result of measuring a complementary observable XA on A. In what follows we ignore the difference
between an observable and random variable and simply call both ZA (or XA).
Of course, one of the pillars of quantum mechanics is that both measurements cannot be per-
formed simultaneously. Because analysis of such complementary measurements can quickly become
a maze of counterfactuals, let us describe the duality more precisely. We start with a pure quantum
state ψABR describing the three quantum systems A, B, and R. Then we imagine a hypothetical
ZA measurement, say, and then design a protocol for data compression of the resulting classical
random variable ZA given side information B. The protocol itself is real enough, and the dual-
ity then states that if we instead perform the XA measurement, it is possible to repurpose the
compression protocol to perform privacy amplification of the classical random variable XA against
system R. The same is true in the reverse direction (modulo the caveats discussed below). We
stress that only one of the two conjugate measurements ZA or XA is ever performed on ψA; we
merely contemplate what would be possible had the other measurement been performed.
There are two caveats regarding the duality that should be emphasized. First, we can only es-
tablish a duality between protocols in which the privacy amplification function or data compression
function is linear. This requirement stems from the need to interpret functions applied to XA as
operations on ZA and vice versa. In general this is problematic, as XA and ZA are complementary
observables and therefore actions taken on one have unavoidable back-actions on the other, but
linear functions will offer a way around this problem.
Secondly, the duality does not hold in both directions for arbitrary states of ABR. As we
shall see, the ability to perform data compression with side information (CSI) implies the ability
to perform privacy amplification (PA). However, we can only show the converse when ψABR has
one of two simple forms, either R is completely correlated with (a hypothetical measurement of)
ZA or B is completely correlated with (a hypothetical measurement of) XA. These restrictions
and the asymmetry of the duality can be traced back to a recently proven form of the uncertainty
principle [4, 12] and the fact that it only sets a lower limit on knowledge of complementary
observables. Going from privacy amplification to data compression implicitly requires an upper
limit, which we deal with by considering the equality conditions of the uncertainty principle, and
these are shown to be exactly the two conditions named above.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to elucidating the duality. In the next section we provide
background on the two tasks, how protocols can be constructed using universal hashing, as well
3as the details of one-shot protocols handling arbitrary inputs and rates that can be achieved in
the case of asymptotically-many identical inputs. Then in Sec. III we examine the “perfect” cases,
that is, when ZA is perfectly recoverable from B or R is completely uncorrelated with a uniformly
random XA, and show that the duality immediately follows from a recently discovered form of
the uncertainty principle. Use of the uncertainty principle helps explain the duality in a simplified
setting and understand the reason for the second caveat above.
As perfect correlation or uncorrelation is difficult to achieve in practice, we are ultimately more
interested in the approximate case. In Sec. IV we investigate the duality in the approximate case
and show that R is approximately uncorrelated with XA if ZA is approximately recoverable from
B, and vice versa. This serves as a stepping stone to studying full-fledged CSI and PA protocols,
as taken up in Sec. V. Therein we show how CSI protocols utilizing linear hashing can be used
to construct, and can be constructed from, linear-hashing based PA protocols. In the case of
protocols designed for inputs consisting of asymptotically-many copies of a fixed resource state,
the uncertainty principle of [4, 12] implies that the duality preserves optimality of protocols in that
optimal CSI protocols can be transformed into optimal PA protocols, and vice versa. Combining
this with recent results on one-shot CSI, this construction implies a new uncertainty principle
formulated in terms of smooth min- and max-entropies, which we discuss in Sec. VI along with
additional applications and relations to other work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Classical-Quantum States
In order to describe protocols involving hybrid classical-quantum systems, it is convenient to
work within the formalism of quantum mechanics. In this language, a classical random variable
ZA and quantum side information S can be described by the classical-quantum (cq) state
ψASZ =
d−1∑
z=0
pz |z〉〈z|A ⊗ ϕSz , (1)
where z are the possible values the random variable ZA can take, with alphabet size d, pz is the
probability that ZA = z, and ϕSz is the quantum state of S conditioned on the value of z. The A
system is effectively classical in the sense that an an unconditional measurement in the |z〉 basis
has no effect on the state; essentially it has already been measured. The measurement defines
the ZA observable, up to specifying the values of the possible outcomes, i.e. the position of the
position observable. In the present context these values are irrelevant, as we are content with
simply enumerating them. The subscript, here Z, indicates this is a cq state and which observable
defines the classical basis.
The entropy of the classical random variable ZA given the quantum side information S is defined
by
H(ZA|R)ψAS
Z
≡ H(AR)ψAS
Z
−H(S)ψS
Z
, (2)
where H(A)ψA = −Tr
[
ψA log2 ψ
A
]
is the von Neumann entropy (measured in bits) and ψSZ =
TrA[ψ
AS
Z ] is the partial trace over the A system.
4In general, ψAS can be thought of as the marginal of the pure state |ψ〉AST , where
|ψ〉AST =
d−1∑
z=0
√
pz |z〉A |z〉T1 |ϕz〉ST2 . (3)
System T consists of two parts, T2 which purifies S for each value of z and T1 which purifies AST2.
Here we name the systems S and T instead of B and R as in the introduction because in the
subsequent sections B and R will take on both roles in different contexts.
From the pure state we can still define the entropy of the classical random variable ZA given
S by first converting back to a cq state. We will often make use of the following definition:
H(ZA|S)ψAST ≡ H(ZA|S)ψAS
Z
.
B. Privacy Amplification Against Quantum Adversaries (PA)
Privacy amplification is the art of extracting a truly secret random variable, a secret key, from
one partially known to an eavesdropper holding some side information S. Functions performing
privacy amplification are usually called extractors, the goal being to produce as much secret key
as possible. Privacy amplification against adversaries holding classical information was introduced
in [2, 3], and was extended to the case of quantum side information in [6, 8, 15].
Using (1), the ideal output of privacy amplification would be a state for which pz =
1
d
and the
ϕSz are all independent of z and equal to one another. This last property implies that ϕ
S
z = ψ
S for
all z. In [15] Renner and Ko¨nig introduced an approximate notion of security and uniformity of ZA
which is universally composable, meaning that ZA can safely be input into any other composable
protocol, and the overall protocol is certain to be secure by virtue of its constituent parts being
secure. This definition says that ZA is approximately secure if the trace distance to the ideal case
1
d
1⊗ ψS is small, where ψS = TrA
[
ψASZ
]
. We will say that ZA is ǫ-secure if
psecure(X|S)ψ ≡ 12
∥∥ψASZ − 1d1⊗ ψS∥∥1 ≤ ǫ. (4)
Use of the trace distance ‖M‖1 ≡ Tr[
√
M †M ] means that the actual ǫ-secure ZA can only be
distinguished from the ideal, a perfect key, with probability at most ǫ.
Renner and Ko¨nig show that privacy amplification can produce an ǫ-secure key of length (num-
ber of bits) ℓǫPA(Z
A|S)ψ given in terms of the smooth min-entropy [14, 15]:
Hǫ1min(Z
A|S)ψ − 2 log 1ǫ2 + 2 ≤ ℓ
ǫ
PA(Z
A|S)ψ ≤ H
√
2ǫ
min (Z
A|S)ψ, (5)
where ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2. For a precise definition of the smooth min-entropy, see Appendix B.
The lower bound is established by constructing an extractor based on universal hashing. In
this scheme the approximate key is created by applying a randomly chosen hash function f to ZA.
The function is chosen from a universal family F of hash functions, each mapping a size d input
alphabet to a size m output alphabet, such that for any pair of inputs z1 and z2 the probability of a
collision of the outputs is no greater than if the function were chosen at random from all functions:
PrF [f(z1) = f(z2)] ≤ 1m ∀ z1, z2.
More properly, such a family is called a 2-universal family, since the outputs exhibit a weaker
form of pairwise independence. Hash families whose outputs are truly pairwise independent are
5called strongly 2-universal, a notion which can be easily extended to k-wise independence. In the
present context we shall focus on using linear hash functions, and since the family of all linear hash
functions is universal, we can immediately apply the results of [15].
Meanwhile, the upper bound applies to any conceivable privacy amplification protocol, and
stems from properties of the min-entropy itself. In the asymptotic i.i.d. case of n → ∞ copies of
ψ¯ASZ , the min-entropy tends to the more well-known von Neumann entropy, H
ǫ
min(Z
A⊗n |S⊗n)ψ⊗n →
nH(ZA|S)ψ + O(
√
n log 1
ǫ
) [21], which implies that in this case universal hashing can produce
approximate keys at the rate
rPA(ψ) ≡ lim
ǫ→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
ℓPA(Z
A⊗n |S⊗n)ψ⊗n = H(ZA|S)ψ, (6)
and furthermore this rate is optimal. These results nicely conform with the intuitive understanding
of Hǫmin(Z
A|S) and H(ZA|S) as uncertainties of ZA given the side information S; the part of ZA
unknown to S should be roughly of this size, so it is sensible that this amount can in fact be
extracted by privacy amplification.
C. Data Compression with Quantum Side Information (CSI)
The problem of data compression with side information, also known as information-
reconciliation, is to compress a random variable ZA in such a way that it can later by recovered
by the compressed version Z ′ together with the side information S. Unlike privacy amplification,
this protocol has two components, a compressor and a decompressor, the goal of course being to
compress the input to as few bits as possible. The case of classical side information was first solved
for in the asymptotic i.i.d. scenario by Slepian and Wolf [19], and a one-shot version was given by
Renner and Wolf [16, 17]. The quantum i.i.d. version was studied by Winter [22] and Devetak and
Winter [5], and recently extended to the one-shot scenario by the present author [13].
The ideal output of such a scheme would be a cq state in which the ϕSz were perfectly distin-
guishable from one another, so that a corresponding measurement of S would perfectly reconstruct
z. A suitable approximate notion is that there should exist some measurement ΛSz for which
the probability pguess(Z
A|B) of successfully identifying z is large. When there does, we say z is
ǫ-recoverable from B in the sense that
pguess(Z
A|B) =
d−1∑
z=0
pzTr
[
ΛSz ϕ
S
z
] ≥ 1− ǫ. (7)
The one shot result can be formulated in terms of the dual quantity to the min-entropy, the max-
entropy, defined in Appendix B. The minimum number of bits ℓǫCSI(Z
A|S)ψ needed to compress
ZA such that it is ǫ-recoverable from S and the compressed version is bounded by
H
√
2ǫ
max(Z
A|S)ψ ≤ ℓǫCSI(ZA|S)ψ ≤ Hǫ1max(ZA|S)ψ + 2 log 1ǫ2 + 4, (8)
again for ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2. The upper bound is found by constructing a compressor using universal
hashing and a decompressor using the so-called “pretty good measurement”, while the lower bound
follows from properties of the max-entropy. Like the min-entropy, the max-entropy also tends to
the von Neumann entropy in the limit of n → ∞ i.i.d. inputs. Defining the rate as in privacy
6amplification, we obtain
rCSI ≡ lim
ǫ→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
ℓCSI(Z
A⊗n |S⊗n)ψ⊗n = H(ZA|S)ψ. (9)
This reproduces the results of Devetak and Winter for the asymptotic i.i.d. case. Again this
result conforms to the intuitive understanding of the conditional entropies. Since Hǫmax(Z
A|S) and
H(ZA|S)ψ are in some sense S’s uncertainty of ZA, it is sensible that the compressor would have
to augment the decompressor’s information by this amount.
III. DUALITY FROM THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE IN THE PERFECT CASE
We now show that the ideal cases that either B is already perfectly correlated with ZA or
R is perfectly uncorrelated with XA are already dual by using a recently derived version of the
uncertainty principle. Although using the uncertainty principle in this way will ultimately prove
insufficient in the approximate case and when attemping to construct one protocol from the other,
the analysis here serves to introduce the nature of the duality in a simplified setting, as well as
understand the reasons behind the second caveat.
As remarked in the introduction, the duality between PA and CSI exists for complementary
observables ZA and XA. Let us be more specific and define these observables to be the Weyl-
Heisenberg operators Z ≡∑d−1k=0 ωk |k〉 〈k| and X ≡∑d−1k=0 |k+1〉 〈k|. Since they aren’t Hermitian,
these operators are not observables in the usual sense since the values they can take on are not real
numbers. However, they each specify a basis of system A, enough to specify two measurements,
which is is all we need here. The two are related by Fourier transform, since the eigenstates
of X are simply |x˜〉 = 1√
d
∑d−1
z=0 ω
−xz |z〉. From this relation it is clear that the observables are
complementary, as the result of ZA measurement on an XA eigenstate is completely random, and
vice versa.
Now consider a recently-discovered form of the uncertainty principle [4, 12], which quantifies
uncertainty by entropy and includes the case of quantum side information,
H(XA|R)ψ +H(ZA|B)ψ ≥ 1. (10)
This holds for arbitrary states ψABR, pure or mixed. Loosely speaking, it states that the entropy
R has about the result of measuring XA, plus the entropy B has about the result of measuring
ZA, cannot be less than 1. Note that it is not possible to perform both of these measurements
simultaneously, since the associated observables do not commute. Nevertheless, the uncertainty
principle constrains what systems B and R can simultaneously “know” about the results of either
measurement.
Let us see how this can be used to show that perfect ZA recovery from B implies perfect XA
security from R. Consider an arbitrary pure state |ψ〉ABR, which we can write
|ψ〉ABR =
∑
z
√
pz |z〉A |ϕz〉BR
=
∑
x
√
qx |x˜〉A |ϑx〉BR .
using the ZA basis |z〉A or the XA basis |x˜〉A. In the ideal case the states ϕBz are perfectly
distinguishable, and therefore H(ZA|B)ψ = 0. By the above this implies H(XA|R)ψ = log2 d,
7which can only occur if all the marginal states ϑRx are identical. Hence R is completely uncorrelated
with XA. Furthermore, H(ZA|B)ψ = 0 also implies that XA is uniformly distributed. Since the
uncertainty principle holds for any state, we can also apply it to ψAB . This yields H(XA)ψ =
log2 d, meaning X
A is uniformly distributed. Thus, XA is an ideal key, uniformly distributed and
completely uncorrelated with R.
We cannot directly make use of the uncertainty principle for the converse, XA security from R
implies ZA recoverability from B. Assuming the former, we have H(XA|R) = 1. But this does
not imply H(ZA|B) = 0 unless the uncertainty principle is tight. As an example, consider the
d = 2 the state |ψ〉ABR = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i |1〉)A |ϕ〉BR, for which H(ZA|B) = H(XA|R) = 1. On the
other hand, if the uncertainty principle is tight, then it is immediate that H(XA|R) = 1 implies
H(ZA|B) = 0 and therefore the desired implication holds.
Thus we are interested in the equality conditions for Eq. 10. The only currently known condi-
tions are that (at least) one of H(XA|R)ψ, H(XA|B)ψ, H(ZA|R)ψ, or H(ZA|B)ψ is zero [12], so
that equality is met when the conditional entropies take on their extreme values. Put differently,
the global state ψABR must in some way be a cq state, be it between A and R, as in ψAR = ψARX or
ψARZ , or between A and B, as in ψ
AB = ψABZ or ψ
AB
X . Moreover, there must be perfect correlation
between the two systems in the sense that the conditional marginal states in either B or R (which
depend on the value of XA or ZA) must be perfectly distinguishable.
For completeness, we briefly recapitulate the argument here. Consider the case that
H(ZA|B)ψ = 0, which immediately implies H(XA|R)ψ ≥ 1. Since 1 is also an upper bound
to the conditional entropy, it must be that H(XA|R)ψ = 1 and the equality conditions are met.
The same argument can be made starting from H(XA|R)ψ = 0. The remaining two quantities
H(XA|B)ψ and H(ZA|R)ψ are related by the complementary form of the uncertainty principle,
obtained by interchanging either the complementary observables XA and ZA or the complementary
systems B and R. The derivation in [12] simultaneously produces both forms of the uncertainty
principle, meaning that satisfying the equality conditions for one implies the same for the other.
Thus, the conditions H(XA|B)ψ = 0 and H(ZA|R)ψ = 0 also lead to equality in (10).
Observe that in the former case of H(XA|B) = 0 andH(XA|R) = 1 we end up withH(XA|B) =
H(ZA|B) = 0, which is a sufficient condition to have maximal entanglement between A and B, as
discussed in [11]. In the other case we end up with H(ZA|B) = H(ZA|R) = 0 and H(XA|B) =
H(XA|R) = 1, a a situation similar to that of a d = 2 GHZ state 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉)ABR.
IV. DUALITY IN THE APPROXIMATE CASE
In this section we examine the duality when ZA is approximately recoverable from B or R
is approximately independent of a nearly uniform XA. Unfortunately, the arguments using the
uncertainty principle in the previous section cannot easily be modified to work in the approximate
case, so here we present a more algebraic treatment. We start with ZA recovery implies XA
security.
Theorem 1. For an arbitrary pure state |ψ〉ABR, suppose pguess(ZA|B)ψ ≥ 1 − ǫ. Then
psecure(X
A|R)ψ ≤
√
2ǫ.
Proof. Start by performing the measurement coherently with a partial isometry UB→BM and an
8ancillary system M . This transforms the state according to
∣∣ψ′〉ABMR ≡ UB→BM |ψ〉ABR
≡
∑
z,z′
√
pz |z〉A
∣∣z′〉M √ΛBz′ |ϕz〉BR .
The ideal output would be
|ξ〉ABMR =
∑
z
√
pz |z〉A |z〉M |ϕz〉BR ,
and computing the fidelity F (ψ′, ξ) ≡ |〈ψ′|ξ〉| between the two we find
F (ψ′, ξ) = 〈ξ|UB→BM |ψ〉ABR
=
∑
z
pz 〈ϕz|
√
ΛBz |ϕz〉BR
≥
∑
z
pz 〈ϕz|ΛBz |ϕz〉BR
= pguess.
Here we have used the fact that
√
Λ ≥ Λ for 0 ≤ Λ ≤ 1. Now rewrite ξ using the complementary
basis |x˜〉A in anticipation of measuring XA. The result is
|ξ〉ABMR = 1√
d
∑
x
|x˜〉A
∑
z
ωxz |z〉M |ϕz〉BR
= 1√
d
∑
x
|x˜〉A (Zx)M
∑
z
|z〉M |ϕz〉BR
= 1√
d
∑
x
|x˜〉A (Zx)M |ψ〉MBR .
In the last line we have implicitly defined the state |ψ〉MBR, which is just |ψ〉ABR with A replaced
by M . It is easy to work out that the result of measuring XA and marginalizing over BM is the
ideal output of privacy amplification of XA against R, namely
ξ¯ARX =
1
d
∑
x
|x˜〉 〈x˜|A ⊗ ψR = 1
d
1
A ⊗ ψR.
Since |ψ〉ABR and |ψ′〉ABMR are related by the isometry UB→BM , measuring XA and tracing out
BM results in the same output for both input states. And because the fidelity cannot decrease
under such a quantum operation (see Appendix A), this implies
F (ψ¯ARX ,
1
d
1
A ⊗ ψR) = F (ψ¯′ARX , 1d1A ⊗ ψR)
≥ F (ψ′, ξ)
≥ pguess(ZA|R)ψ
≥ 1− ǫ.
Finally, from A7 we have psecure(X
A|R) ≤
√
1− F (ψ¯ARX , 1d1A ⊗ ψR)2 ≤
√
2ǫ.
9As discussed in the previous section, there are two routes from ǫ-security of XA against R to
ǫ-recovery of ZA from B. The first case, when H(XA|B)ψ = 0, was implicitly used by Devetak
and Winter in their construction of an entanglement distillation protocol achieving the so-called
hashing bound [6]. The second case, H(ZA|R)ψ = 0 has not, to our knowledge, been previously
studied, but is more natural in the data compression scenario as it enforces the cq nature of the
AB state.
Theorem 2. If |ψ〉ABR is such that psecure(XA|R)ψ ≤ ǫ and either (a) H(XA|B)ψ = 0 or (b)
H(ZA|R)ψ = 0, then pguess(ZA|B)ψ ≥ 1−
√
2ǫ.
Proof. Start with case (a), whose condition implies that |ψ〉ABR takes the form
|ψ〉ABR =
∑
x
√
qx |x˜〉A |x˜〉B1 |ϑx〉B2R ,
where B = B1B2. Tracing out B gives the cq state ψ¯
AR
X =
∑
x qx |x˜〉 〈x˜|A ⊗ ϑRx , and the condition
psecure(X
A|R)ψ ≤ ǫ implies the fidelity of ψ¯ARX with the ideal output exceeds 1− ǫ:
F (ψ¯ARX ,
1
d
1
A ⊗ ψR) =
∑
x
√
qx
d
F (ϑRx , ψ
R)
=
∑
x
√
qx
d
F (|ϑx〉B2R , UMB′→B2x |ψ〉MB
′R)
≥ 1− ǫ.
To get to the second line we have used Uhlmann’s theorem, with corresponding isometries UMB
′→B2
x
for each state ϑRx , and the state |ψ〉MB
′R is the same as |ψ〉ABR with A replaced by M and B by
B′. Now define the state
|ξ〉ABR = 1√
d
d−1∑
x=0
|x˜〉A |x˜〉B1 UMB′→B2x |ψ〉MB
′R ,
and observe that that F (|ξ〉ABR , |ψ〉ABR) = F (ψ¯ARX , 1d1A⊗ψR). Hence F (|ξ〉ABR , |ψ〉ABR) ≥ 1−ǫ,
and converting to trace distance, we find D(ψABR, ξABR) ≤ √2ǫ.
Applying the conditional isometry
V B1B2→B1MB
′
=
∑
x
|x˜〉 〈x˜|B1 ⊗ U †MB′→B2x
to |ξ〉ABR yields 1√
d
∑
x |x˜〉A |x˜〉B1 |ψ〉MB
′R, and converting the result back to the |z〉 basis gives
1√
d
∑
z |z〉A |−z〉B1 |ψ〉MB
′R, where aritmetic inside the state vector is modulo d. Thus, the mea-
surement
ΛBz = V
†B1B2→B1MB′ |−z〉 〈−z|B1 V B1B2→B1MB′
enables perfect recovery of z from B for the state ξABR. But the measurement is a quantum
operation, which cannot increase the trace distance, and the trace distance after a measurement
is simply the variational distance of the resulting probability distributions. Therefore we can infer
that
1
2
∑
z,z′
∣∣pzδz,z′ − pzTr [ΛBz′ϕBz ]∣∣ ≤ √2ǫ.
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Working out the lefthand side of this equation, we find that pguess(Z|B)ψ ≥ 1−
√
2ǫ.
Now consider case (b), whose condition implies |ψ〉ABR can be written
|ψ〉ABR =
∑
z
√
pz |z〉A |z〉R1 |ϕz〉BR2 .
Using the complementary basis for A gives the alternate form
|ψ〉ABR = 1√
d
∑
xz
√
pz |x˜〉A ωxz |z〉R1 |ϕz〉BR2
= 1√
d
∑
x
|x˜〉A (Zx)R1
∑
z
√
pz |z〉R1 |ϕz〉BR2
= 1√
d
∑
x
|x˜〉A (Zx)R1 |θ〉BR , (11)
where in the last line we have implicitly defined the state |θ〉BR. Observe that ψR is invariant
under the action of (Zx)R1 , since ψR = 1
d
∑
x(Z
x)R1θR(Zx)†R1 . Next, compute the fidelity of ψARX
with 1
d
1
X ⊗ ψR, using the definition θRx = (Zx)R1θR(Zx)†R1 :
F (ψARX ,
1
d
1
X ⊗ ψR) = 1
d
∑
x
F (θRx , ψ
R)
= 1
d
∑
x
F ((Zx)R1θR(Zx)†R1 , ψR)
= F (θR, ψR).
Again psecure(X|R) ≤ ǫ implies F (ψARX , 1d1X ⊗ ψR) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Since we now have F (θR, ψR) ≥
1 − ǫ, it follows by Uhlmann’s theorem that there exists an isometry UMB→B such that
〈θ|UMB→B |ψ〉MBR ≥ 1− ǫ. Now consider the state
|ξ〉ABMR ≡ 1√
d
∑
x
|x˜〉A (Zx)R1 |ψ〉MBR
= 1
d
∑
x,z,z′
∣∣z′〉A ωx(z−z′)√pz |z, z〉MR1 |ϕz〉BR2
=
∑
z
√
pz |z〉A |z〉M |z〉R1 |ϕz〉BR2 ,
from which z can obviously be recovered by measuring M . The overlap of this state with
U †MB→B |ψ〉ABR is just F (θR, ψR), so we should expect pguess(Z|B)ψ to be large when using the
measurement
ΛBz = U
MB→B |z〉 〈z|M U †MB→B .
Indeed, converting the fidelity to trace distance and working out the variational distance just as
before yields pguess(Z|B)ψ ≥ 1−
√
2ǫ.
V. DUALITY FOR PROTOCOLS
Having worked out the duality for approximate recoverability or secrecy, we can now begin
investigating how the duality works for protocols designed to transform arbitrary inputs to the
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approximate case. Since the duality concerns transforming operations on XA into operations on
ZA and vice versa, we first face the problem that operations on one necessarily affect the other
in some way. By confining our analysis to PA and CSI protocols in which the outputs are linear
functions of the inputs, we may avail ourselves of the stabilizer formalism, and this will enable us
to ensure the back action from XA operations is consistent with the ZA transformation we wish to
implement, and vice versa. A short description of those aspects of the stabilizer formalism needed
here is given in Appendix C. We begin with the case of repurposing data compression into privacy
amplification, as it is more straightforward.
Theorem 3. Let PǫCSI be a protocol for compressing of ZA to a string C of ℓǫCSI bits via a linear
compression encoding map f : Z → C = {0, 1}ℓǫCSI . If ZA is ǫ-recoverable by the decoding map
D : (C,B)→ Z ′, then the encoder can be repurposed to extract ⌈log2 dim(A)⌉−ℓǫCSI
√
2ǫ-secure bits
from XA which are uncorrelated with R.
Proof. First we embed system A into an integer number ⌈log2 dim(A)⌉ of qubits. Then, using the
encoding map f we can define a subsystem decomposition A = A¯Aˆ using z¯ = f(z) as detailed in
Appendix C. This enables us to write the input state |Ψ〉ABR as
|Ψ〉ABR =
∑
z
√
pz |z〉A |ϕz〉BR
=
∑
z¯,zˆ
√
pz(z¯,zˆ) |z¯〉A¯ |zˆ〉Aˆ
∣∣ϕz(z¯,zˆ)〉BR .
Since z is ǫ-recoverable from the combined system A¯B by definition of the protocol, Theorem 1
applies. Therefore xˆ, the result of measuring encoded Xˆ operators on Aˆ, is ǫ-secure against R.
But xˆ = g⊥(x), for g⊥ related to f as in Appendix C, so g⊥ defines a key extraction function. As
f outputs a ℓǫCSI-bit string, the output of g⊥ must be a string of ⌈log2 dim(A)⌉ − ℓǫCSI bits.
Now we take up the converse. Again case (a) is similar to results found by Devetak and Winter
in [6], though, because they do not use linear functions, they cannot directly interpret their use of
privacy amplification as data compression of an independently-defined complementary observable.
We shall return to this issue at the end of this section. Reiterating the statement made prior
to Theorem 2, case (b) is more naturally suited to the data compression with side information
scenario, whose input a cq state by assumption.
Theorem 4. Let PǫPA be a protocol for privacy amplification of XA against R consisting of a linear
extraction map g : XA → K = {0, 1}ℓǫPA and let the input be a pure state ψABR such that either
(a) H(XA|B)ψ = 0 or (b) H(ZA|R)ψ = 0. If PǫPA produces ℓǫPA ǫ-secure bits, then the extraction
map can then be used to define a compressor and corresponding decoding map which together can
be used to compress ZA to ⌈log2 dim(A)⌉ − ℓǫPA bits such that ZA is
√
2ǫ-recoverable from the side
information B and compressed version C.
Proof. Start with case (a). Again we embed system A into dA ≡ ⌈log2 dim(A)⌉ bits for simplicitly.
The input state has the form
|Ψ〉ABR =
∑
x
√
qx |x˜〉A |x˜〉B1 |ϑx〉B2R
=
∑
x¯,xˆ
√
qx |x¯〉A¯ |xˆ〉Aˆ |x¯〉B¯1 |xˆ〉Bˆ1 |ϑx〉B2R , (12)
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where we have used the subsystem decomposition A = A¯Aˆ from x¯ = g(x) and suppressed the
dependence of x on (x¯, xˆ). By assumption x¯ is ǫ-secure against R. Thus, Theorem 2 applies to the
division A¯|AˆB|R, and there exists a measurement ΛAˆBz¯ such that z¯ is
√
2ǫ-recoverable from AˆB.
Since Aˆ is not directly available to the decoder, we must break the measurement down into
a compressor with classical output and subsequent measurement of B alone, conditional on this
output. To do this, suppose Aˆ is measured in the Z basis, producing zˆ, which results in the state
|Ψzˆ〉 =
∑
x¯,xˆ
√
qx |x¯〉A¯ |x¯〉B¯1 ωxˆ·zˆ |xˆ〉Bˆ1 |ϑx〉B2R
=
∑
x¯,xˆ
√
qx |x¯〉A¯ |x¯〉B¯1
(
X zˆ
)Bˆ1 |xˆ〉Bˆ1 |ϑx〉B2R
with probability 1/(dA− ℓǫPA). All zˆ dependence drops out when tracing out the B systems, so the
marginal states of R conditional on x¯ are the same as in (12). Therefore, Theorem 2 implies z¯ is
ǫ-recoverable from B alone for each value of zˆ. Since the pair (z¯, zˆ) fixes the value of z, zˆ ≡ f⊥(z)
is a suitable compression map enabling ǫ-recovery of z from B and C = f⊥(ZA).
Now consider case (b), whose input state is of the form
|Ψ〉 =
∑
z
√
pz |z〉A |z〉R1 |ϕz〉BR2 (13)
= 1√
dn
∑
x
|x˜〉A (Zx)R1 |Θ〉BR2
= 1√
dn
∑
x¯,xˆ
|x¯〉A¯ |xˆ〉Aˆ (Z x¯)R¯1(Z xˆ)Rˆ1 |Θ〉BR2 .
Here we have converted to the alternate form in the second equation, following (11), with |Θ〉BR =∑
z
√
pz |z〉R1 |ϕz〉BR2 . For the third equation we again use the subsystem decomposition for A =
A¯Aˆ as well as R1 = R¯1Rˆ1. By assumption, x¯ is ǫ-secure against R, so just as for case (a) Theorem 2
applies to the division A¯|AˆB|R and implies there exists a measurement ΛAˆBz¯ such that z¯ is
√
2ǫ-
recoverable from AˆB.
This measurement can be broken down into a compression map with classical output followed by
measurement of B alone following the technique used in the previous case. This time, we model the
measurement quantum-mechanically, as the transformation |zˆ〉Aˆ1 → |zˆ〉C |zˆ〉R3 . However, from (13)
it is clear that the same effect can be achieved by the transformation |zˆ〉Aˆ1 → |zˆ〉C followed by
|zˆ〉Rˆ1 → |zˆ〉Rˆ1 |zˆ〉R3 . In other words, there is no need to distribute zˆ to R, since R already has
a copy. Thus, the effect of the measurement is simply to transfer Aˆ to C. Using the function
zˆ ≡ f⊥(z) as the compressor therefore ensures that z¯, and hence z, is ǫ-recoverable from (B,C).
In both cases f⊥ outputs dA − ℓǫPA bits when g outputs ℓǫPA, completing the proof.
VI. DISCUSSION & APPLICATIONS
The reasons for restricting attention to linear hashing techniques in this analysis should now be
more understandable. Since the duality between PA and CSI is meant to hold for complementary
observables, it is not a priori clear that, e.g. a given privacy amplification function applied to XA
has a well-defined action on ZA, let alone the desired one. However, the use of linear hashing to
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deal with this problem is only shown here to be sufficient, not necessary, and it would be nice to
understand more precisely under what circumstances this duality holds.
This issue is somewhat subtle, and deserves further comment. By the results in Sec. IV, once,
say, privacy amplification of XA against R has been performed, it is certainly possible to define
an appropriate complementary observable ZA so that it is recoverable from B. However, this
observable generally has nothing whatsoever to do with a complementary observable that we might
have defined for the input to the privacy amplification procedure, and in particular, the two need
not commute so as to be simultaneously well-defined. For instance, in [6], privacy amplification is
used as the second step of an entanglement distillation protocol. Since the output is entangled,
both XA and ZA complementary observables are recoverable from B. But these observables have
nothing to do with complementary observables one would have defined for the input to the protocol,
so one cannot say the PA procedure performs CSI. Thus, while ǫ-security of XA and ǫ-recovery
of ZA always go hand in hand, it does not follow from that alone that PA and CSI protocols
necessarily do, too. On the other hand, in many situations in quantum information processing,
such as in [6], this distinction is not important.
Perhaps the most direct application of our results is a general entropic uncertainty relation
formulated in terms of the smooth conditional min- and max-entropies [24]. Using the upper
bound of 8, Theorem 1, and the lower bound of 5 for an input system whose dimension d is a
power of two, we immediately obtain
log2 d ≤ H
√
2
√
2ǫ
min (X
A|R)ψ +Hǫ1max(ZA|B)ψ + 2 log 1ǫ2 + 4 (14)
for ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2. From the definition of the smoothed conditional max-entropy it follows that
Hǫ
′
max(Z
A|B) ≤ Hǫmax(ZA|B) for ǫ′ ≥ ǫ, so if we choose ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ2 and ǫ = δ
4
8 , the above
expression can be transformed into the more appealing form
Hδmin(X
A|R)ψ +Hδmax(ZA|R)ψ ≥ log2 d− 8 log 1δ − 12. (15)
This extends the recent work on uncertainty principles valid in the presence of quantum mem-
ory [4, 12] to the smooth min- and max-entropy. Due to the operational interpretations of these
quantities [9], this relation should be useful in the analysis of quantum information processing
protocols.
Another application of this work is to a new approximate quantum error-correcting condition.
This will be explored more fully in a future publication, but we can already give a brief overview
here. Essentially, the quantum decoupling condition of [18] mentioned in the introduction can be
broken down into two classical pieces. That condition states that AB is maximally entangled when
A is completely uncorrelated with the purification system R, and it is in a completely random state.
Approximate quantum error-correcting procedures can then be constructed by approximately de-
coupling R. The entanglement distillation procedure of Devetak and Winter [6] implicitly gives a
different characterization, saying that AB is maximally entangled if ZA is recoverable from B and
secure from R. Using the duality of these recoverability and security notions, there are in princi-
ple two other equivalent characterizations of approximate entanglement, from which approximate
quantum error-correcting procedures can likewise be constructed. The first one states that AB is
maximally entangled if both XA and ZA are recoverable from B, a condition which was implicitly
explored in [11]. The second is the classical decomposition of the quantum decoupling condition,
that AB is entangled if both XA and ZA are secure from R, with the additional proviso that one
of them, say XA, is secure not just from R, but from R together with a copy of ZA.
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Appendix A: Fidelity and Trace Distance
Here we recount some facts about the trace distance and fidelity. Proofs can be found in, e.g.
[10]. The trace distance D(ρ, σ) between two quantum states ρ and σ is defined by
D(ρ, σ) = 12 ‖ρ− σ‖1 , (A1)
where ‖A‖1 =
√
A†A. It is invariant under unitary operations on the inputs and cannot increase
under trace preserving quantum operations. In particular, if a measurement Λk yields outcome k
with probability rk for ρ and sk for σ, then the trace distance bounds the variational distance of
the two distributions
D(ρ, σ) ≥ 12
∑
k
|rk − sk| . (A2)
Moreover, the trace distance is the largest probability difference the two states ρ and σ could assign
to the same measurement outcome Λ,
D(ρ, σ) = max
Λ
Tr [Λ(ρ− σ)] , 0 ≤ Λ ≤ 1. (A3)
Therefore, if the trace distance between ρ and σ is small, they behave nearly identically under all
measurements.
Meanwhile, the fidelity F (ρ, σ) is defined by
F (ρ, σ) =
∥∥√ρ√σ∥∥
1
, (A4)
and it, too, is invariant under unitary operations on the inputs and monotonic under trace preserv-
ing quantum operations, in this case increasing. By Uhlmann’s theorem the fidelity of two mixed
states is related to the fidelity of their purifications. If |ψ〉QR is a purification of ρQ and likewise
|ϕ〉QR is a purification of σQ, then
F (ρ, σ) = max
UR
F (|ψ〉QR , (1Q ⊗ UR) |ϕ〉QR) (A5)
= max
UR
〈ψ|QR (1Q ⊗ UR) |ϕ〉QR , (A6)
for UR a unitary on the purifying system R. If this purifying system is different for the two states,
say |ψ〉QR1 and |ϕ〉QR2 , then the maximization is instead over partial isometries UR2→R1 taking
R2 to R1.
The trace distance and fidelity are essentially equivalent measures of closeness of two quantum
states, via
1− F (ρ, σ) ≤ D(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2. (A7)
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Appendix B: Smooth Entropies
The smooth min- and max-entropies were first introduced by Renner & Wolf for the classical
case [16, 17] in order to characterize information processing protocols beyond the usual asymptotic
i.i.d. scenario to cases where the input random variables or channels are essentially structureless.
They were subsequently extended to the quantum case by Renner [14] and Renner & Ko¨nig [15],
and have undergone several additional refinements. Here we follow the definitions given in [20].
First, the conditional min-entropy for a state ρAB is defined by
Hmin(A|B)ρ ≡ max
σB
(− log λmin(ρAB , σB)) , (B1)
with λmin(ρ
AB , σB)≡min{λ : ρAB ≤ λ1A ⊗ σB}. Dual to the conditional min-entropy is the con-
ditional max-entropy, defined by
Hmax(A|B)ρ ≡ max
σB
2 log F (ρAB ,1A ⊗ σB). (B2)
The two are dual in the sense that, for ρABC a pure state, Hmax(A|B)ρ = −Hmin(A|C)ρ [9].
Each of these entropies can be smoothed by considering states ρ¯AB in the ǫ-neighborhood of
ρAB , defined using the purification distance P (ρ, σ) ≡
√
1− F (ρ, ρ¯)2,
Bǫ(ρ) ≡ {ρ¯ : P (ρ, σ) ≤ ǫ}. (B3)
Note that the purification distance is essentially equivalent to the trace distance, due to the bounds
D(ρ, σ) ≤ P (ρ, σ) ≤
√
2D(ρ, σ), which are just a reformulation of A7. The smoothed entropies are
then given by
Hǫmin(A|B)ρ ≡ max
ρ¯∈Bǫ(ρAB)
Hmin(A|B)ρ¯, (B4)
Hǫmax(A|B)ρ ≡ min
ρ¯∈Bǫ(ρAB)
Hmax(A|B)ρ¯. (B5)
Furthermore, the dual of Hǫmax(A|B)ρ is Hǫmin(A|C)ρ, so that taking the dual and smoothing can
be performed in either order [20].
Appendix C: CSS Stabilizer Formalism
The stabilizer formalism developed by Gottesman [7] in the context of quantum error-correction
is perfectly suited to describing the effects of applying linear functions to the complementary
observables XA and ZA. In fact, here we will only need a subset of these results, for so-called
Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) stabilizers. Here we give an exceedingly brief overview; for more
details see [10].
For simplicity, fix d = 2; the resulting statements actually apply for any d which is a power
of a prime number. Starting with a collection A of n 2-dimensional quantum systems A1, . . . An,
suppose we would like to apply a linear function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m to the result z of measuring
each system Ai in the Z basis. Since the function is linear, each output bit is the result of computing
the inner product of z with a fixed binary string hj , f(z)j = z · hj . But then the jth output bit
is nothing other than the result of measuring the operator Zhj ≡ Zhj,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zhj,n , where hj,k is
the kth component of the vector hj. As much holds for X by Fourier symmetry.
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It can be shown that given m linearly independent vectors hj , the resulting (commuting) opera-
tors Zhj stabilize a subspace of dimension 2k, with k = n−m, meaning that there exist 2k linearly
independent common eigenvectors of the set. Therefore, a basis for the space Fn2 translates into
a basis for the space C2
n
and the operators Zhj form a complete set of commuting observables,
to use language more familiar in quantum mechanics. Any basis will do, and indeed the usual
decomposition of C2
n
as n copies of C2 just corresponds to the Fn2 basis of vectors defined by
components ej,k = δj,k.
Moreover, the algebra of Fn2 carries over into the commutation relations between X-type stabi-
lizers and Z-type stabilizers. Since XZ = −ZX, it follows immediately that
XgjZhk = (−1)gj ·hkZhkXgj . (C1)
This condition can be used to define encoded qubits and corresponding anticommuting encoded
X and Z operators. The X and Z operators of the physical qubits are such that each Zej anti-
commutes with just one of the Xek , namely j = k, and commutes with all the others. This can be
extended to an arbitrary basis hj by finding its dual basis gk for which gj · hk = δj,k. Each pair
(gj ,hj) then corresponds to a pair of encoded (X,Z) operators.
Suppose f(z) is a linear function for which the corresponding set of vectors {h¯j}mj=1 is linearly
independent. This set we can take as defining a basis for the corresponding subspace in Fm2 , and
this basis can be completed by finding a basis of n−m vectors {hˆj}nj=m+1 for the complementary
subspace. The complementary basis defines its own function, f⊥. Since together f and f⊥ make
up an invertible function (the associated matrix is invertible), a string z can just as well be char-
acterized by the pair (f(z), f⊥(z)). Calling these outputs z¯ = f(z) and zˆ = f⊥(z), respectively, we
can regard z as a function of the pair (z¯, zˆ).
The stabilizer construction allows us to apply this transformation to the state vectors of the
n qubits as well, meaning that we can relabel the basis states |z〉 ≃ |z¯, zˆ〉. That is, using the
stabilizers we can perform Fn2 arithmetic inside the kets in a meaningful way. And it respects the
tensor product as well, meaning for a system A of n qubits we can use the collection of encoded
operators for f to define a subsystem A¯ and those for f⊥ to define a subsystem Aˆ, so that together
HA = HA¯ ⊗HAˆ. Or, more compactly, A = A¯Aˆ.
Finally, we can now see that this formalism controls the back action from applying f on ZA to
the complementary operators XA. In the above decomposition of A into A¯ and Aˆ, we are still free
to switch to the complementary basis in either subsystem, and in doing so we go from f (f⊥) to g
(g⊥). If we convert Aˆ to the X basis, then the resulting basis describes the possible simultaneous
f(z) and g⊥(x) outputs, even though x and z do not exist simultaneously.
[1] Abeyesinghe, A., Devetak, I., Hayden, P. & Winter, A. 2009 The mother of all protocols: restructuring
quantum informations family tree. Proc. R. Soc. A, 465(2108), 2537–2563.
[2] Bennett, C., Brassard, G. & Robert, J. 1986 How to reduce your enemy’s information. In Advances
in cryptology – CRYPTO 85, vol. 218/1986 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 468–476. Santa
Barbara, CA: Springer.
[3] Bennett, C. H., Brassard, G. & Robert, J. 1988 Privacy amplification by public discussion. SIAM J.
Comput., 17(2), 210–229.
[4] Berta, M., Christandl, M., Colbeck, R., Renes, J. M. & Renner, R. 2010 An entropic uncertainty
relation with quantum side information. Nat. Phys. DOI: 10.1038/nphys1734.
17
[5] Devetak, I. & Winter, A. 2003 Classical data compression with quantum side information. Phys. Rev.
A, 68(4), 042 301.
[6] Devetak, I. & Winter, A. 2005 Distillation of secret key and entanglement from quantum states. Proc.
R. Soc. A, 461(2053), 207–235.
[7] Gottesman, D. 1997 Stabilizer codes and quantum error correction. Ph.D. thesis, California Institute
of Technology. arXiv:quant-ph/9705052v1.
[8] Ko¨nig, R., Maurer, U. & Renner, R. 2005 On the power of quantum memory. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
51(7), 2391–2401.
[9] Konig, R., Renner, R. & Schaffner, C. 2009 The operational meaning of min- and Max-Entropy. IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, 55(9), 4337–4347.
[10] Nielsen, M. A. & Chuang, I. L. 2000 Quantum computation and quantum information. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[11] Renes, J. M. & Boileau, J. 2008 Physical underpinnings of privacy. Phys. Rev. A, 78(3), 032 335–12.
[12] Renes, J. M. & Boileau, J. 2009 Conjectured strong complementary information tradeoff. Phys. Rev.
Lett., 103(2), 020 402–4.
[13] Renes, J. M. & Renner, R. 2010 One-shot classical data compression with quantum side information
and the distillation of common randomness or secret keys. arXiv:1008.0452v1 [quant-ph].
[14] Renner, R. 2005 Security of quantum key distribution. Ph.D. thesis, ETH Zu¨rich. arXiv:quant-
ph/0512258v2.
[15] Renner, R. & Ko¨nig, R. 2005 Universally composable privacy amplification against quantum adver-
saries. In Second theory of cryptography conference, vol. 3378/2005 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pp. 407–425. Cambridge, MA: Springer.
[16] Renner, R. & Wolf, S. 2004 Smooth renyi entropy and applications. In Proceedings 2004 IEEE inter-
national symposium on information theory, p. 233. New York City: IEEE.
[17] Renner, R. & Wolf, S. 2005 Simple and tight bounds for information reconciliation and privacy am-
plification. In Advances in cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp.
199–216. Berlin: Springer.
[18] Schumacher, B. & Westmoreland, M. D. 2002 Approximate quantum error correction. Quant. Inf.
Proc., 1(1), 5–12.
[19] Slepian, D. & Wolf, J. K. 1973 Noiseless coding of correlated information sources. IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, 19(4), 471–480.
[20] Tomamichel, M., Colbeck, R. & Renner, R. 2009 Duality between smooth min- and Max-Entropies.
arXiv:0907.5238v1 [quant-ph].
[21] Tomamichel, M., Colbeck, R. & Renner, R. 2009 A fully quantum asymptotic equipartition property.
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 55(12), 5840–5847.
[22] Winter, A. 1999 Coding theorems of quantum information theory. Ph.D. thesis, Universita¨t Bielefeld.
arXiv:quant-ph/9907077v1.
[23] In the communication scenario complementary systems become complementary channels. An arbitrary
channel E taking A to B can be thought of as an isometry taking A to BR by the Stinespring dilation,
and considering only the R portion of the output defines the complementary channel E# to E .
[24] That such a consequence ought to hold was pointed out by Matthias Christandl.
